This is a huge area of philosophical debate, leading to, among other things, Karl Popper’s philosophically controversial notion of falsificationism (see Godfrey-Smith, 2003). These concerns apply more to how physics is done than to how geology is done, since the former is a science that emphasizes deduction, while the latter is one that emphasizes abduction or retroduction (Baker, 1999, Baker, 2000a and Baker, 2000b). The use of analogs from Earth’s past to understand Earth’s future is not a

form of uniformitarianism. As noted above, SCH-900776 uniformitarianism is and always has been a logically problematic concept; it can neither be validly used to predict the future nor can its a priori assertions about nature be considered to be a part of valid scientific reasoning. While analogical reasoning also cannot be validly used to predict the future, it does, when properly used, contribute to the advancement of scientific understanding about the Earth (Baker, 2014). As an aside, it should be added that systems science is so structured so that

it is designed to facilitate predictions. The logical difficulty with systems predictions is that of underdetermination of theory by data, which holds that it is never possible as a practical matter selleck products when dealing with complex matters of the real world (as opposed to what is presumed when defining a “system”) to ever achieve a verification (or falsification) of a predicted outcome (Oreskes et al., 1994 and Sarewitz Amino acid et al., 2000). The word “prediction” is closely tied to the issues of “systems” because it is the ability to define a system that allows the deductive force of mathematics to be applied (mathematics is the science that draws necessary conclusions). By invoking “prediction” Knight

and Harrison (2014) emphasize the role of deduction in the inferential process of science. While this is appropriate for the kind of physical science that employs systems thinking, it is very misleading in regard to the use of analogy and uniformitarianism by geologists. As elaborated upon by Baker (2014), analogical reasoning in geology, as classically argued by Gilbert, 1886 and Gilbert, 1896 and others, is really a combination of two logically appropriate forms of reasoning: induction and abduction. The latter commonly gets confused with flawed understandings of both induction and deduction. However, it is not possible to elaborate further on this point because a primer on issues of logical inference is not possible in a short review, and the reader is referred discussions by Von Englehardt and Zimmermann (1988) and Baker, 1996b and Baker, 1999. Among the processes that actually exist and can be directly measured and observed are those that have been highly affected by human action.